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The	 Pashtun	 Tahafuz	 Movement	 (PTM)—Pashtun	 Protection	
Movement	 in	English—emerged	in	the	Pashtun	districts	of	Pakistan	











This	 article	 discusses	 the	 Pashtun	 Tahafuz	 Movement's	 (PTM)	
demand	 for	 establishing	 a	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	
(TRC)	to	facilitate	the	right	to	truth	of	victims	of	the	war	on	terror	
in	 Pakistan.	 It	 highlights	 the	 tension	 among	 the	 right	 to	 truth,	
geopolitical	 considerations,	 and	 historiography	 in	 pursuit	 of	
transitional	justice	under	a	stable	regime.	It	argues	that	Pakistan	is	
not	 likely	 to	establish	a	TRC	due	 to	 its	geopolitical	 considerations	
vis-a-vis	Afghanistan.	 It,	however,	 also	underscores	 that	PTM	as	a	
pressure	group	could	contribute	greatly	to	realising	several	human	
rights	based	 right	 claims	of	 the	war	 victims,	 if	 it	 disengages	 itself	
from	the	anti-Pakistan	Afghan	diaspora.			





terror	 (Mallick	 2020).	 The	 war,	 initially	 directed	 at	 the	 Taliban	
government	 in	 Afghanistan,	 quickly	 spilled	 over	 into	 the	 Pashtun	
border	districts	of	Pakistan,	formally	known	as	FATA.1	Consequently,	
these	 districts	 suffered	 massive	 violence,	 widespread	 abuse	 of	
human	 rights,	 and	 immense	 material	 damage	 (Amnesty	 2012,	
Crawford	2018,	NACTA	2018,	ICG	2009).	
	 The	PTM	demands	a	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	(TRC)	
to	 identify	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 violations	 and	 to	
ascertain	 the	 causes	 and	 conduct	 of	 the	 war	 on	 terror,	 thereby	
allowing	 the	 victims	 to	 know	 the	 truth	 about	 the	 violence	 they	
suffered	 (Siddiqui	2019).	The	commission	has	not	been	established	
and	 remains	 a	 mere	 PTM	 demand	 which	 Pakistan's	 government	
refuses	 to	 entertain.	 Nevertheless,	 several	 PTM	 activists	 have	 high	
hopes	for	the	commission	and	believe	that	only	an	‘independent’	TRC	





does	 establish	 a	 TRC,	 as	 some	 other	 stable	 regimes	 did	
(Wiebelhaus‐Brahm	 2020),	 the	 geopolitical	 context	 and	
historiographical	function	of	the	TRC	will	likely	undermine	the	right	
to	truth.	
	 The	 article	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 The	 first	 section	 is	 an	
introduction	and	the	second	focuses	on	the	study’s	methodology.	The	
third	 section	 provides	 a	 theoretical	 context	 and	 the	 fourth	 section	
introduces	 the	 concerned	 stakeholders.	 The	 fifth	 and	 sixth	 sections	




group	 seek	 to	 inquire	 into	 the	working	 of	 their	 group,	 they	 can	 be	
assumed	 to	 be	 undertaking	 insider	 action	 research	 (Coghlan	 and	
Brannick	2005).		
	 I	 belong	 to	 the	 same	 ethnic	 group	 that	 the	 PTM	 claims	 to	
represent—the	 Pashtun—and	 support	 the	 PTM3.	 I,	 however,	
disagree	 with	 PTM’s	 association	 with	 the	 anti-Pakistan	 Afghan	
diaspora,	 which	 openly	 asks	 for	 the	 disintegration	 of	 the	 Pakistan	




claims	 on	 the	 state	 of	 Pakistan,	 because	 it	 makes	 PTM	 look	 like	 a	
movement	 with	 secessionist	 tendency	 which	 the	 state	 would	 not	
tolerate.	Consequently,	the	state	tends	to	deal	with	PTM	as	a	security	
concern,	 which	 takes	 the	 state’s	 focus	 away	 from	 the	 human	 right	
claims	and	makes	 it	 less	 likely	 for	the	public	to	support	the	group’s	
goals.			





	 Inside	 positionality	 has	 both	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages.	 In	
my	 case,	 the	 advantage	 is	 that,	 as	 a	 Pakistani	 Pashtun	 and	 a	 PTM	
supporter	 I	 am	 relatively	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 distracted	 by	 the	
"ethnographic	dazzle"—	which	is	a	distraction	from	comprehending	
subtle	 meaning	 making,	 which	 may	 lead	 a	 researcher	 to	 draw	
simplistic	conclusions	(McNess,	Arthur,	and	Crossley	2015).		
	 Empirical	 information	 for	 this	 article	 comes	 from	 my	 pre-
understanding	 of	 the	 PTM,5	which	 includes	multiple	 interactions—
both	face-to-face	and	on	social	media—with	PTM	activists,	including	
its	 leader,	Manzoor	Pashteen.6	 The	 interactions	 are	 linked	with	my	
interest	in	the	war	on	terror	in	the	Pashtun	area	of	Pakistan,	the	area	
I	 am	 from	and	where	 I	 have	 a	 home	as	well	 as	 family,	 friends,	 and	
colleagues.	Moreover,	I	have	also	had	discussions	with	some	security	
personnel	of	Pakistan	who	fought	the	Taliban	and	Al-Qaida	militants	
on	 the	 frontlines,	 including	 the	 uniformed	 officer	 who	 has	 killed	
Saiful	 Asad,	 the	 infamous	 Uzbek	 Al-Qaida	 militant	 known	 for	
beheading	many	people	in	the	area.7		
	 Pre-understanding	 can	 also	 have	 disadvantages.	 For	 example,	
the	researchers	may	assume	they	know	enough	based	on	their	pre-
understanding	and	may	not	probe	as	much	as	an	outsider	or	a	 less	
knowledgeable	 researcher	 might.	 This	 may	 prevent	 an	 insider	
researcher	 from	 making	 critical	 reflections	 on	 the	 research	
phenomenon	 (Coghlan	 and	 Casey	 2001).	 The	 disadvantage	 of	
assuming	 too	much	 is	more	 likely	 that	 the	 researcher—in	 this	 case	
myself—is	politically	involved	in	the	research	context.	For	example,	I	





	 The	 Afghan	 diaspora	 strongly	 supports	 the	 PTM’s	 demand	 for	
the	 establishment	 of	 an	 independent	 TRC.	 Their	 support	 has	
confronted	 me	 with	 the	 ethical	 challenge	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	 line	
between	my	role	as	a	PTM	supporter	with	a	note	of	dissent	and	my	
role	 as	 a	 researcher.	 I	 deal	 with	 this	 challenge	 by	 looking	 into	
literature	 about	 truth	 commissions	 in	 order	 to	 explore	what	 a	TRC	
could	achieve	in	Pakistan	in	terms	of	the	right	to	truth.		
Theoretical	Context	
Modern	 transitional	 justice	 is	 a	 complex	 post-Second	 World	 War	
notion	that	evolved	in	the	decades	following	the	war's	conclusion.	It	
aims	 to	address	violent	 legacies	of	 the	past	 to	 facilitate	a	 transition	
towards	 a	 more	 peaceful	 and	 democratic	 society.	 Depending	 upon	
the	context,	it	involves	various	judicial	and	non-judicial	mechanisms	
and	 processes,	 including	 truth-telling	 (Haider	 2016)	 in	 the	 form	 of	
truth	commissions.		
Truth	 commissions	 are	 non-judicial,	 independent	 panels	 of	 inquiry	
established	 to	uncover	 facts	 in	 the	 context	 of	 serious	human	 rights	
violations	 in	a	 country’s	past	 (ICTJ	Focus	Truth	Commission	2008).	
The	 commissions	 are	 especially	 relevant	 as	 a	 restorative	 justice	
mechanism	 in	 contexts	 where	 retributive	 justice	 may	 not	 be	 an	
option	for	various	reasons,	such	as	political	pressure.	So	far,	over	70	
truth	 commissions	 have	 been	 conducted	 around	 the	 world	 (CMI	
TRUCOM	 project	 webpage).	 To	 what	 extent	 these	 various	
commissions	around	the	world	have	achieved	their	stated	objectives	
is	debateable	(Hayner	2011,	Chapman	and	Ball	2001,	Grandin	2005,	
Wiebelhaus‐Brahm	 2020).	 Nevertheless,	 fresh	 demands	 for	 these	
commissions	 keep	 coming.	 The	 latest	 demand	 is	 from	 the	 PTM	 in	
Pakistan.	 "A	 truth	 commission	 will	 help	 bring	 out	 truth	 on	 what	
really	 happened	 in	 our	 area	 since	 9/11,"	 explains	 PTM’s	 leader,	
Manzoor	Pashteen,	to	a	news	website	(Siddiqui	2019).		
Truth	Commissions	and	Stable	Regimes	
Transitional	 justice	 is	 associated	 with	 periods	 of	 political	 change	




conflicts.	 There	 are	 also	 examples	 of	 mature	 democracies	




Canada	 employed	 a	 truth	 commission	 to	 establish	 a	 shared	




rights	 violations	 that	 occurred	 (Wiebelhaus‐Brahm	 2020).	 Frames	
are	not	themselves	(transitional	justice)	ideas	but	ways	of	packaging	
and	presenting	ideas	that	generate	shared	beliefs,	motivate	collective	
action,	 and	 define	 appropriate	 strategies	 of	 action’	 (Merry	 2006,	
136).	Most	governments	may	have	a	tendency	to	exploit	transitional	
justice	 norms	 to	 advance	 their	 own	 interests	 and	 some	 do	 so	 by	
framing	the	ideas	of	transitional	justice	(Loyle	and	Davenport	2016).		
	 Pakistan	 is	 also	 a	 stable	 government	 where	 the	 longstanding	
civil-military	power	imbalance	remains	the	defining	feature	of	power	
politics	 (Rizvi	 2000).	 Pakistan's	 army	 has	 also	 retaken	 the	 war	 on	
terror	battleground	in	the	border	districts	from	the	Tehrek-e-Taliban	
Pakistan	 (TTP)	 militants	 through	 massive	 kinetic	 operations,8	 but	
the	conflict	 in	Afghanistan	 is	still	going	on	with	no	realistic	signs	of	
its	 ending	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 which	motivates	 Pakistan,	 like	 other	
states,	to	subordinate	human	rights	causes	to	geopolitical	interests.		
	 Also,	 due	 to	 geopolitical	 reasons,	major	world	powers	 involved	
in	conflicts	around	the	world	prefer	stability	over	human	rights.	This	
is	 also	 a	 reason	 why	 Sri	 Lanka,	 which	 lacks	 the	 geo-strategic	
importance	 that	 Morocco	 and	 Bahrain	 have	 for	 the	 major	 world	
powers,	 faced	 far	 greater	 diplomatic	 criticism	 on	 its	 human	 rights	
violations	than	the	latter	two	countries	(Wiebelhaus‐Brahm	2020).		
	 Pakistan	is	also	a	US	ally	in	the	war	on	terror.	Both	countries	are	
accused	 of	 rights	 violations	 and	 a	 major	 investigation	 would	
implicate	them	both	(Amnesty	2012,	Sanders	2018,	Alston,	Morgan-
Foster,	 and	 Abresch	 2008).	 Due	 to	 the	 ongoing	 conflict	 in	
Afghanistan,	 both	 countries	 have	 restricted	 access	 to	 intelligence	
information	 about	 controversial	 practices	 of	 the	 war	 on	 terror,	 so	
much	so	that,	even	years	after	the	war,	leaks	are	the	primary	means	
revealing	any	information	about	them,	such	as	the	Wiki	Leaks.	It	may	
be	 very	 difficult	 to	 identify	 perpetrators	 of	 the	 rights	 violations	 or	
even	construct	an	authentic	historical	narrative	without	access	to	the	
relevant	 intelligence	 information.	 This	 indicates	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	






Truth	 commissions	 do	 not	 claim	 to	 produce	 professional	
histographies,	but	they	do	strive	to	construct	authoritative	histories	
of	the	past	that	have	the	capacity	to	affect	public	narratives	about	the	
historical	 contexts.	 They	 construct	 histories	 through	 human	 rights	
investigations.	This	is	a	challenging	task	because	transitional	justice	
is	an	inherently	political	phenomenon	(Vinjamuri	and	Snyder	2015)	
where	 the	 political	 field	 influences	 the	 truth	 commissions'	 rights	
investigations.	 Truth	 commissions	 deal	 with	 this	 challenge	 by	
adopting	various	narrative	strategies	that	rule	out	alternative	history	
narratives	(Bakiner	2015)	and	by	implication	may	also	compromise	
the	victims’	 right	 to	 truth	(Duthie	and	Seil	2017,	Chapman	and	Ball	
2001).		




date	of	 the	human	rights	 investigation	 (such	as	 the	commissions	 in	
Sri	 Lanka	 and	 Chad),	 while	 some	 have	 a	 long	 time	 period	 to	
investigate,	such	as	the	Norwegian	commission	which	is	mandated	to	
look	 into	 the	 time	 period	 since	 1800	 and	 could	 even	 extend	 its	
search	 further	 into	 the	 past,	 if	 necessary.9	 Some	 stakeholders	may	
dispute	a	specific	 time	 length	because	 it	has	serious	 implications	 in	
terms	 of	 how	 the	 commission	 will	 narrativize	 the	 past	 (Bakiner	
2015).	In	case	of	a	TRC	established	in	Pakistan,	the	time	period	of	its	
human	 rights	 investigation	will	 likely	 be	 a	 point	 of	 dispute	 among	
the	concerned	stakeholders.	
	 Gramsci’s	 famous	 statement	 that	 "history	 is	 always	
contemporary,	that	is,	political,"	depicts	well	the	Afghan	narrative	of	
history	(Qassem	and	Durand	2008),	in	which	they	see	the	violations	
of	 Pashtun	 rights	 in	 Pakistan	 during	 the	 war	 on	 terror	 as	 a	
continuation	of	 the	nineteenth-century	Great	Game	between	Russia	
and	 the	British	 (Hopkirk	1992),	which	 resulted	 in	 the	 first,	 second,	
and	 third	 Anglo-Afghan	wars	 in	 Afghanistan.	 The	 Great	 Game	 later	
transformed	 into	 Cold	War-era	 tensions	 between	 the	 Soviet	 Union	
and	 the	West	 in	 the	 region,	 culminating	with	 the	Soviet	 invasion	of	
Afghanistan.	 The	 Soviet	 withdrawal	 led	 to	 prolonged	 chaos	 in	
Afghanistan,	 resulting	 in	 the	9/11	 attacks,	which	 triggered	 the	war	




British	 colonialism	 in	 the	 region,	whereby,	 they	 believe	 the	 British	
snatched	territories	from	India	and	Afghanistan	to	create	the	state	of	
Pakistan	 in	 order	 to	 promote	Western	 interests	 against	 the	 Soviet	
Union.10	 They	 say	 that	 Pakistan’s	 Pashtun	 territory	 belongs	 to	
Afghanistan	 and	 must	 be	 reunited	 with	 it	 (Qassem	 and	 Durand	
2008).11	In	this	regard,	the	PTM	demand	for	a	TRC	is	looked	upon	by	
Afghans	 as	 a	 historical	 event	 that	would	 help	 to	 substantiate	 their	
claims	on	Pakistan’s	Pashtun	territory.	
	 As	 Afghanistan's	 neighbour,	 Pakistan	 could	 not	 remain	
unaffected	by	the	conflict	in	Afghanistan	and	consequently	becomes	
involved,	 especially	 when	 Afghanistan	 becomes	 an	 arena	 of	
international	 proxy	 wars,	 which	 Pakistan	 perceives	 as	 a	 potential	
security	 threat	 (Rubin	 and	 Siddique	 2006).	 Afghans	 typically	 see	
Pakistan's	involvement	through	the	lenses	of	their	old	Afghan	claims	
on	the	Pashtun	areas	of	Pakistan	(Qureshi	1966).	As	a	result,	there	is	
more	 Afghan	 anger	 and	 hatred	 towards	 Pakistan	 than	 any	 other	
regional	 and	 international	 power	 involved	 in	 the	 country.12	 A	
significant	 section	 of	 the	 Afghan	 population,	 especially	 Pashtun,	
refuse	 to	 accept	 the	 international	 border	 between	 Pakistan	 and	
Afghanistan—also	known	as	Durand	Line—which	makes	 it	 difficult	
for	 any	 government	 in	 Afghanistan	 to	 publicly	 reject	 claims	 on	
Pakistani	 territory	 (Qassem	 and	 Durand	 2008).	 The	 post-Taliban	
government	in	Afghanistan		had	no	formal	policy	on	the	border	with	
Pakistan	 (Rubin	 and	 Siddique	 2006),	 but	 Afghan	 ministers	 and	
officials	 stated	 from	 time	 to	 time	 that	 they	 do	 not	 recognise	 the	
border	 with	 Pakistan,	 or	 they	 claim	 that	 the	 people,	 not	 the	
government	 of	 Afghanistan,	 have	 the	 right	 to	 decide	 about	 the	






the	 UN’s	 basic	 principles	 and	 guide	 on	 the	 right	 to	 a	 remedy	 and	
reparation,	 access	 to	 relevant	 information	 about	 human	 rights	
violations	 is	 part	 of	 the	 victims’	 right	 to	 remedy	 concerning	 the	
violations	(UN60/147	2005).	Based	on	the	Inter-American	Court	on	
Human	Rights’	decision	 in	 the	Velasquez	Rodriguez	case	 in	 the	 late	




victims	 to	 seek	 the	 truth	 about	 their	 past	 rights	 violations	 (Brahm	
2007).	There	are	various	soft	law	instruments	to	ascertain	the	right	
to	 truth	 (Shelton	 2009).	 However,	 support	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	
right	to	truth	 is	a	claimed	right	that	the	state	 is	obligated	to	ensure	





with	 the	 rest	 of	 Pakistan	 by	 a	 constitutional	 amendment	 that	
abolished	 the	 British	 colonial	 made	 Frontier	 Crimes	 Regulations,	






actual	 rights	violations.	A	case	 in	point	 is	Pakistan’s	Commission	of	




Truth	 commissions	 are	 contested	 processes	 in	 which	 stakeholders	
compete	 for	 power	 to	 establish	 the	 truth	 (Ross	 2006).	 Stakeholder	
are	actors	who	are	likely	to	take	an	interest	in	a	process	if	they	have	








on	 terror.	 In	 2015,	 about	 15	 young	men	 from	 the	 area	 formed	 the	
MTM	to	give	a	voice	to	the	victims,	who	at	that	time	could	not	openly	
speak	 due	 to	 fear	 of	 the	 Taliban	 and	 the	 intelligence	 agencies	 of	








by	 the	police	 in	Karachi.	 In	 response,	 the	MTM	 led	a	protest	march	
from	Waziristan	 to	 the	 capital,	 Islamabad.	On	 the	way,	war	 victims	
from	 other	 border	 districts	 joined.	 The	 movement	 was	 no	 longer	




	 The	 PTM	 is	mainly	 led	 by	 the	 children	 of	war—that	 is,	minors	
who	 became	 adults	 during	 the	war	 on	 terror	 in	 the	 region—which	
includes	 the	 25-year-old	 leader	 of	 the	movement,	Manzoor	 Ahmad	
Pashteen.	The	movement	put	 forward	 five	demands	to	 the	Pakistan	
army:	 end	 extrajudicial	 killings,	 end	 forced	 disappearances	 plus	
presentation	of	the	disappeared	persons	to	the	court	of	law,	dignified	
treatment	 of	 the	 public	 at	 military	 check	 posts,	 the	 removal	 of	
landmines	 in	 Waziristan,	 and	 justice	 for	 Naqeeb	 Mahsud’s	 family.	
Later,	 the	 PTM	 also	 put	 forward	 its	 demand	 for	 a	 TRC	 in	 a	 large	
public	 gathering	 in	 Lahore	 in	 April	 2018.18	 Zubair	Mahsud	 (Zubair	
2018),	a	prominent	PTM	activist	now	based	in	the	US,	first	proposed	





Soviet	 invasion	 in	 1979.	 They	 support	 PTM	 and	 their	 support	 is	
deeply	 rooted	 in	 historiography	 and	 their	 claims	 on	 the	 Pashtun	
territory	of	Pakistan	and	the	role	of	 the	British	Indian	empire	since	
1838	 and	 later	 the	 role	 of	 Pakistan	 in	 Afghanistan	 following	 the	
partition	 of	 the	 British	 India	 in	 1947.	 They	 see	 PTM	 as	 a	 wider	




Moreover,	 the	diaspora	uses	 social	media	 to	 promote	 anti-Pakistan	




encourage	 Pakistani	 Pashtun	 to	 revolt	 against	 Pakistan	 to	 avenge	
Pakistan’s	role	in	the	proxy	wars	in	Afghanistan.21		
Pakistanised	Pashtuns	
Responding	 to	 the	 social	media	 campaigns	 of	 the	 Afghan	 diaspora,	
the	 Pashtuns	 who	 are	 integrated	 in	 Pakistan	 (also	 known	 as	
Pakistanised	 Pashtuns)	 have	 also	 taken	 up	 social	media	 to	 counter	
the	Afghan	narratives.	Every	day,	both	Afghan	diaspora	Pashtun	and	
Pakistanised	 Pashtun	 use	 social	 media	 forums	 to	 discredit	 each	
other’s	 narratives.	 The	 Afghan	 activists	 name	 Pakistanised	 Pashtun	
as	the	biggest	hurdle	in	their	way	to	dismantle	Pakistan,	or	what	the	
Afghans	 variously	 call	 the	 Punjab	 Regiment,	 the	 British	 project,	




	 The	 Pashtun	 are	 integrated	 into	 Pakistan,	 especially	 in	 its	
powerful	 armed	 forces	 (Fair	 and	 Nawaz	 2011);	 in	 the	 country’s	
mainstream	 political	 parties,	 in	 its	 economic	 hub	 Karachi	 and	 they	
are	settled	 in	all	regions	of	Pakistan.	All	 this	has	 led	to	what	can	be	
termed	 as	 the	Pakistanisation	 of	 Pashtun,	which	 is	 also	marked	 by	
their	 lack	 of	 attention	 to	 Afghanistan’s	 irritant	 claims	 on	 Pashtun	
areas	of	Pakistan	(Qureshi	1966,	Ahmed	and	Khan	2020).	
	 The	 Pakistanised	 Pashtun	 supported	 PTM	 in	 the	 beginning	 but	
have	since	distanced	themselves	from	it.	They	view	the	PTM	more	as	
a	group	with	separatist	 tendencies	 than	as	a	movement	 fighting	 for	
the	 rights	 of	 war	 victims.	 This	 is	 also	 the	 reason	 why	 PTM	
demonstrations	 abroad	 are	 overwhelmingly	 dominated	 by	 anti-
Pakistan	 Afghans	 with	 no	 or	 little	 participation	 from	 Pakistani	
Pashtuns.	 The	 Pakistanised	 Pashtun	 stand	 as	 allies	 of	 the	 Pakistan	
state	in	the	clashes	over	historical	narratives	with	the	Afghans.24	
Pakistan	State,	More	Precisely	its	Army	
The	 Pakistan	 army's	 establishment	 continues	 to	 exert	 definitive	
influence	 over	 the	 country’s	 security	 policy.	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	
reason	why	the	PTM	always	directly	addresses	the	Pakistan	army—
but	 almost	 never	 the	 civilian	 government	 of	 Pakistan—in	 its	






The	 world	 was	 told	 that	 the	 Pakistan	 army	 was	 fighting	 against	
terrorism.	Of	course,	there	was	somewhat	of	a	small	conflict	they	were	
engaged	 in	 –	 but	 it	 was	 a	 really	 strange	 conflict.	 The	 Taliban	 were	 a	
handful	 and	 yet	 they	 survived	 and	 escaped	 while	 hundreds	 of	 our	
people	were	 killed.	How	 is	 this	 possible?	And	 then	 the	Taliban	would	
also	 target	 civilians	 through	 suicide	 bombings.	 From	 both	 sides,	 we	





	 Pakistan’s	 powerful	 army	 generals'	 initial	 reaction	 to	 the	 PTM	
was	positive.	Major-General	Asif	Ghafoor—the	then	former	director-
general	 of	 Inter-Services	 Public	 Relations	 (DG	 ISPR)—said	 that	 the	
Pakistan	army	chief	had	given	strict	instructions	not	to	use	force	on	
PTM	 gatherings	 (Dawn	 2018).	 Some	 of	 the	 PTM	 demands	 were	
moving	towards	resolution.		
	 Manzoor	 Pashteen,	 the	 PTM	 leader,	 has	 confirmed	 on	 social	
media	that	hundreds	of	disappeared	persons	have	returned	to	their	
homes	 and	 that	 the	 intelligence	 agencies’	 practice	 of	 disappearing	
people	 has	 slowed	 down.	 Moreover,	 the	 extrajudicial	 killing	 of	
Pashtun	has	declined.	The	security	forces’	behaviour	towards	people	
passing	 army	 check	 posts	 has	 also	 improved.	 Another	 PTM	
demand—that	 Anwar	 Rao,	 the	 police	 officer	 who	 killed	 Naqeeb	
Mahsud,	must	face	justice—has	also	been	partially	addressed,	as	the	
case	is	now	in	the	court.	
	 However,	 the	 Afghan	 diaspora’s	 growing	 association	 with	 the	




example,	within	 days	 of	 its	 creation,	 some	PTM	activists	 raised	 the	
slogan,	 "Accountability	 from	 Najib	 to	 Naqib."26	 This	 slogan	
underscores	 that	 some	 in	 the	 PTM	 exclusively	 hold	 the	 Pakistan	
army	 responsible	 for	 the	 massive	 violence	 experienced	 in	
Afghanistan	since	the	1979	Soviet	invasion,	 in	which	Pakistan	sided	
with	 the	 West	 as	 a	 front-line	 ally.	 Those	 Pashtun	 nationalists	 in	
Pakistan,	who	are	often	suspected	of	harbouring	anti-Pakistan	views,	





	 Consequently,	 the	 army’s	 view	 of	 the	 PTM	 has	 become	 less	
unsympathetic.	 In	April	 2019,	 a	 Pakistan	 army	 spokesman	publicly	
warned	 the	 PTM,	 saying	 that	 "their	 time	 is	 up"	 (Dawn	2019).	Now	






There	 is	 no	 meaningful	 international	 or	 domestic	 pressure	 on	
Pakistan	to	respond	to	the	rights	violations.	Support	of	major	world	
powers	 can	 promote	 human	 rights	 causes	 but	 the	 support	 is	 often	
dependent	 on	 geopolitical	 dynamics	 (Wiebelhaus‐Brahm	 2020).	
Pakistan	 does	 respond	 to	 international	 pressure	 from	 its	 major	
Western	 allies.	 A	 case	 in	 point	 is	 Pakistan’s	 efforts	 to	 improve	 its	
financial	 regulations	 (Butt,	 Rashid,	 and	 Khan	 2020)	 in	 response	 to	
the	 Financial	 Action	 Task	 Force	 (FATF)’s	 decision	 in	 2018	 to	 put	
Pakistan	on	the	grey	 list	due	to	 its	 lack	of	measures	 for	anti-money	
laundering	and	terrorism	financing,	a	decision	that	springs	from	the	
geopolitical	considerations	of	the	US	in	Afghanistan	(Shah	2021).	
	 The	War	 on	 Terror	 is	 a	 different	 case,	 where	 both	 the	 US	 and	
Pakistan	 are	 deeply	 involved	 and	 the	 conflict	 in	 Afghanistan	 has	
entered	 a	 new	 stage	 of	 proxy	 wars	 following	 the	 fall	 of	 the	
government	 of	 President	 Ghani	 and	 the	 return	 of	 the	 Taliban	 to	
Kabul	 in	August	2021.	Additionally,	both	state	and	non-state	actors	
are	 accused	 of	 massive	 rights	 violations	 in	 the	 war	 on	 terror	
(Amnesty	 2012).	 The	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 are	 not	 limited	 to	
Pakistan	and	the	US	since	the	war	on	terror	is	a	global	war	involving	
several	 regional	 and	 international	 powers.	 A	 further	 twist	 of	
complexity	is	added	by	anecdotal	evidence	and	also	by	the	involved	
states’	 accusations	 against	 each	 other	 that	 many	 of	 the	 non-state	
actors,	militant	organizations,	and	individual	militants	are	proxies	of	
the	 involved	 states’	 intelligence	 agencies.29	 This	 means	 that	 both	
intelligence	agencies	and	their	proxy	militant	groups	are	directly	or	
indirectly	 implicated	 in	 or	 at	 least	 suspected	 of	 the	 rights	
violations.30	 The	 involved	 intelligence	 agencies	 are	 unlikely	 to	
publicly	share	honest	information	when	the	conflict	in	Afghanistan	is	







national	 governments.	 In	 some	 cases,	 the	 commissions	 were	






Portuguese	 administration"	 until	 its	 independence	 in	 1999	 (CAVR	
2005,	12).	The	UN,	however,	could	not	do	anything	against	Indonesia	
because	 the	 country	 was	 a	 trusted	 Cold	 War	 ally	 of	 the	 West.	
Following	 the	Cold	War,	 Indonesia	came	under	pressure	 to	address	
the	 East	 Timor	 question	 leading	 to	 the	 UN-led	 initiative	 that	
culminated	with	independence	of	East	Timor.	Contrarily,	no	Pashtun	
area	of	Pakistan	is	on	the	UN	agenda.	Moreover,	 in	the	current	geo-
politics	 in	the	region,	 it	 is	unlikely	the	UN	would	entertain	the	PTM	
demand	for	a	UN-led	TRC.		
	 Pakistan,	 however,	 is	 not	 unfamiliar	 with	 UN-led	 inquiry	
commissions.	 Even	 if	 Pakistan	 accepts	 a	 UN-led	 commission,	 it	 is	
much	more	 likely	that	 the	country	would	closely	guard	 its	security-
related,	sensitive	information	from	the	reach	of	the	commission.	This	
is	what	Pakistan	did	with	the	UN	commission	on	the	assassination	of	
Benazir	 Bhutto,	 the	 former	 prime	 minister	 of	 Pakistan,	 allegedly	
killed	by	Al-Qaida	militants	in	2007.	The	commission	faced	a	lack	of	
cooperation	 from	 Pakistan's	 military	 and	 intelligence	 authorities	
(United	Nations	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 2010,	 3).	Moreover,	 the	US	
government	also	did	not	allow	the	commission	members	to	meet	US	
intelligence	officials	 (United	Nations	Commission	of	 Inquiry,	 2010).	
As	 a	 result,	 the	 product—the	 commission’s	 report—adds	 nothing	
significant	 to	what	 is	already	publicly	known	about	 the	high-profile	
killing.		
	 At	 the	 domestic	 level,	 the	 PTM	 demand	 of	 a	 UN-led	 TRC	 is	
different	 from	 the	 demand	 for	 the	 UN-led	 investigation	 on	 the	
assassination	of	Benazir	Bhutto,	although	both	are	located	in	the	war	
on	 terror	 context.	 Bhutto	 was	 the	 twice-elected	 prime	 minister	 of	
Pakistan	 and	 leader	 of	 the	 largest	 federal	 party	 of	 Pakistan,	 the	
Pakistan	 People’s	 Party	 (PPP),	 which	 demanded	 a	 UN-led	




supported	 this	 demand.	 The	 party	 came	 to	 power	 in	 the	 election	




	 In	 its	 initial	 days	 and	 weeks,	 the	 PTM	 generated	 wider	 public	
support	 in	 Pakistan,	 especially	 in	 the	 Pashtun	 areas.	 This,	 in	 turn,	
generated	 public	 pressure	 on	 Pakistan's	 army	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
PTM’s	 demands,	 and	 the	 army	 did	 positively	 respond	 to	 an	 extent.	
There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 a	 popular	 Pashtun	movement	 could	 not	 be	
ignored	 by	 Pakistan's	 army	 because	 Pashtun	 are	 integrated	 in	 the	
army,	 which	 would	 not	 want	 to	 be	 publicly	 perceived	 as	 an	 anti-
Pashtun	 organization.	 In	 this	 context,	 then,	 the	 PTM	 had	 the	
opportunity	 to	press	 the	army-dominated	Pakistan	state	 to	address	
the	Pashtun	rights	violations	in	the	war.	The	opportunity	went	astray	
when	 PTM’s	 linkages	 with	 Afghan	 diaspora	 became	 increasingly	
clearer,	daunting	its	public	support.	As	a	result,	it	could	not	generate	




the	 PTM’s	 demand,	 the	 commission	 itself	 is	 likely	 to	 land	 in	
controversy	 over	 historiography.	 Truth	 commissions	 confronting	
challenges	 over	 their	 historiographical	 role	 is	 not	 unusual.	
Commissions	 around	 the	 world	 have	 adopted	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	
following	 four	 strategies	 to	 deal	 with	 contestations	 over	
historiography:	 adjudication,	 avoidance,	 giving	 voice	 and	
transformation	 (Bakiner	 2015).	 Adjudication	 is	 confirmation	 or	
disconfirmation	 of	 elements	 of	 the	 contending	 history	 narratives,	
avoidance	 refers	 to	 avoiding	 judgement	 on	 the	 conflicting	 history	
narratives,	 giving	 voice	 means	 bringing	 to	 the	 forefront	 the	
experiences	 of	 the	 hitherto	 silenced	 individuals	 and	 groups,	 and	
transformation	 is	 disengaging	 the	 history	 narratives	 from	 its	 social	
embeddedness	 by	 incorporating	 the	 rights	 and	 transitional	 justice	
perspectives	in	the	discussion	about	the	past.		
	 None	of	the	above	narrative	strategies	could	sufficiently	work	in	
Pakistan.	 Adjudication	 and	 avoidance	 will	 easily	 make	 the	
commission's	 final	 report	 biased	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 one	 or	more	 of	 the	




commissions’	 work.	 One	 is	 to	 give	 voice	 to	 the	 sufferings	 of	 those	
forced	into	silence	and	oblivion.	A	commission	in	Pakistan	could	also	
do	 so	 but	 this	 will	 be	 short	 of	 the	 PTM	 demand	 which	 wants	 the	
commission	to	 identify	 the	perpetrators	of	 the	rights	violations	and	
ascertain	the	causes	and	conduct	of	the	war	on	terror.	Second,	truth	
commissions	 may	 provide	 an	 opportunity	 to	 the	 perpetrators	 to	
testify	 and	 confess	 to	 the	 rights	 violations.	 Historical	 evidence	
suggests	 that	 most	 truth	 commission	 mandates	 do	 not	 allow	 the	
commissions	 to	 identify	 the	 perpetrators	 and	 therefore,	 the	




come	 forward	 to	 confess	 before	 the	 commission	 when	 conflict	 in	
Afghanistan	is	not	over.	
	 Transformation	refers	 to	 formulating	the	commission	report	on	
human	 rights	 and	 transnational	 justice	 ideas	 in	 order	 to	 shift	 the	
focus	 on	 the	 state's	 human	 rights	 obligations	 and	 generate	 moral	
pressure	on	it	to	reform	the	discriminatory	political	order	(Grandin	
2005).	 States	 engaged	 in	 geopolitical	 struggles	 may	 construct	
transitional	 justice-based	 mechanisms	 to	 address	 human	 rights	
violations,	but	are	likely	to	subordinate	the	mechanisms	to	strategic	
considerations.	This	 is	what	Pakistan	did	in	the	past	and	is	 likely	to	
do	so	 in	the	future	for	at	 least	as	 long	as	the	conflict	 in	Afghanistan	
remains.	 A	 case	 in	 point	 is	 Pakistan’s	 commission	 on	 the	 killing	 of	






Across	 the	 world,	 the	 main	 goals	 of	 transitional	 justice	 are	
institutional	 reforms,	 reparations,	 memorialisation,	 accountability,	
acknowledgment,	 and	 truth-telling.	 Activists	 and	 scholars	 have	
highlighted	 smaller	 but	 significant	 forms	 of	 justice	 to	 many,	 if	 not	
most,	 victims	 of	 rights	 abuses	 living	 under	 stable	 regimes	





	 Pakistan's	 government	 has	 undertaken	multiple	 legislative	 and	
administrative	 reforms	 to	address	 the	destructions	 that	 the	war	on	
terror	has	caused.	New	laws	have	been	enacted	[National	Action	Plan	
(NAP)	 and	 the	National	 Counter	Terrorism	Authority	 (ACTA)32	 and	
the	 border	 districts	 have	 been	 legally	 integrated	 in	 Pakistan	 (the	
eighteenth	 constitutional	 amendment).	 Reparations	 have	 also	 been	
paid	 to	 many,	 though	 not	 all,	 war	 victims,	 and	 infrastructure	
rebuilding	 is	 underway.	 The	 border	 with	 Afghanistan,	 which	 has	
remained	open	since	the	time	of	the	British,	is	now	being	fenced	in	a	
bid	to	control	cross-border	terrorism.		
	 Importantly,	 hundreds	 of	 forcibly	 disappeared	 people	 have	
returned	 from	 secret	 jails.33	 The	 frequency	 of	 both	 disappearances	
and	 targeted	killings	has	decreased.	 Several	military	 check	posts	 in	
the	 war-affected	 areas	 have	 been	 removed	 and	 some	 have	 been	




	 Memorialisation	 refers	 to	 plans	 to	 preserve	 the	 memory	 of	
human	rights	violations,	 including	through	architectural	memorials,	
commemorative	 activities,	 and	 educational	 programs	 to	 establish	
historical	 public	 records	 in	 order	 to	 help	 prevent	 repetition	 of	 the	
rights	 violations	 (ICTJ/Truth-and-Memory).	 The	 Pakistan	 state	 has	
taken	 steps	 towards	 memorialising	 some	 of	 the	 rights	 violations,	
although	more	needs	 to	 be	done;	 for	 example,	most	massacre	 sites	
have	not	yet	been	memorialised.34	
	 Memorialisation	cannot	be	limited	to	state	initiatives,	and	people	
can	 also	 contribute	 to	 it	 through	 individual	 and	 collective	 efforts.	
Such	 efforts	 are	 already	 underway	 in	 Pakistan;	 for	 example,	 PTM	
activist,	Alamzeb	Wazir’s,	book	about	the	disappeared	persons.35	The	
PTM	 itself	 is	 a	 form	 of	memorialising	 the	war	 victims	 in	 the	 sense	
that	the	PTM’s	struggle	 is	now	part	of	Pashto	poetry.	Moreover,	 the	
PTM	has	brought	many	cases	of	rights	violations	to	public	knowledge	
and	has	 preserved	 them	 in	 social	media	 video	 clips;	 otherwise,	 the	
memory	of	these	violations	could	have	drifted	into	oblivion.	
	 Accountability,	 acknowledgment,	 and	 truth-telling	 remain	 a	
challenge	in	Pakistan	in	the	face	of	the	conflict	in	Afghanistan	and	the	
military’s	domination	of	Pakistan’s	politics.	However,	a	lot	more	can	




group	 could	 play	 a	 remarkable	 role	 to	 compel	 the	 state	 to	 address	
these	rights	violations	but	only	if	 it	prevents	itself	 from	becoming	a	
proxy	 in	 the	 international	 conflict	 in	Afghanistan.	This	 requires	 the	





1 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan	
2 The PTM’s leader, Manzoor Pashteen, and other prominent PTM activists, such 
Ali Wazir, Dr. Said Alam Mahsud, Mohsin Dawar, Bushra Gohar, and others 
have expressed such hope on their social accounts and in interviews.		
3	See my facebook posts and writings, such as this: https://farhattaj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/Article-PTM-irredent-claims-army.pdf 
4 Since the emergences of the PTM, the Afghans settled in the West have 
established multiple platforms for PTM. They regularly hold demonstrations 
against Pakistan in the Western cities that call for destruction of Pakistan and its 
army. They use social media platforms against Pakistan. Some in the diaspora 
also participate in the platforms that use propaganda against Pakistan as 
mentioned in the Indian  Chronicles report of the EU Disinfo lab. (EU Disinfo 
Lab 2020)  
5 The PTM is basically a social media-driven movement that mobilises and 
organises its activities on the ground through social media activism. 
6 I twice met Pashteen in 2019, once in Islamabad and once in Peshawar at the 
house of my longtime friend, Jamil Gilani, who is also a prominent PTM activist. 
The meeting at Gilani’s house in Peshawar was about 8 hours long, during which 
multiple aspects of the PTM struggle were discussed. In addition to that, I know 
some prominent PTM activists and about their longtime political struggle long 
before the emergence of the PTM in 2018, such as Dr. Said Alam Mehsud, 
Afrasiab Khattak, and Bushra Gohar. All of them are prominent Pashtun political 
activists of Pakistan. Moreover, I am also in contact with some other activists of 
PTM, such as Hayat Pregal, a well-known rights activist from Waziristan, 
Pakistan. One of the ideologues behind the emergence of PTM is Akhtar Khan 
Wazir, who is also a friend of mine and who authored a chapter and a half in my 
book Taliban and Anti-Taliban. 
7 I choose not to disclose the identity of the officer because he is currently on 
duty in the armed forces of Pakistan. 	
8 Although the army is still in the area and still sporadically faces terror attacks 
from across the border in Afghanistan, especially in the Waziristan district. 
9	Mandate of the Norwegian Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
https://uit.no/kommisjonen/mandat_en 
10	For example, see any of the daily Afghan social media narratives about the 
conflict in Afghanistan. 
11 The Afghan state has not placed claims on Pakistani territory in any 
international legal forum, minus its objection to Pakistan’s UN membership in 
September 1947, an objection that it took back within a few weeks (see UN 
digital archives, see 92nd and 96th UN plenary meetings on 30 September 1947 




																																								 																																							 																																							 									
does not openly support claims on Pakistan, but occasionally Afghan officials 
issue statements in support of claims on Pakistan, such as the former Qandahar 
police chief, Abdul Razik Achakzai (killed in October 2018), who often 
supported such claims. Now his brother, Khadeen—also Qandahar’s police 
chief—keeps making such claims. Other Afghan ministers and officials make 
such claims from time to time. Afghan intellectuals routinely make such claims, 
and even the Taliban, paradoxically, the traditional allies of the Pakistan 
intelligence agencies, also support such claims.   
12	The anger can be seen in loud anti-Pakistan protests by Afghans across Europe 
and North America and also protests inside Afghanistan.  
13 For example, in 2006, the Afghan minister for border and tribal affairs said 
that Afghanistan does not recognise the border with Pakistan. Similarly, the slain 
police chief of Qandahar repeatedly refused to recognise the border. The current 
President Ghani also said (in a TV interview that  later circulated on social 
media) that the people, not the government of Afghanistan, will decide about the 
border with Pakistan.	
14 The FCR was a British response to protect the northwest frontier of British 
India from Russian advancement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Many argue that Pakistan specifically kept this region under the colonial FCR to 
counter claims of neighbouring Afghanistan over the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.	
15 Millions of IDPs have returned to their homes; hundreds of disappeared 
persons have been released and  reunited with their families, apparently on the 
condition that they will not publicly speak about their ordeal, since most of the 
released persons from the border districts have never publicly spoken about their 
disappearance, minus a few exceptions. 
16 http://coioed.pk/ 
17 Mahsud is a tribe in Waziristan. 
18 The Nation, ‘"PTM demands truth and reconciliation commission": 
https://nation.com.pk/23-Apr-2018/591180 
19 Pakistan Today, April 16, 2019, "Pashteen reiterates formation of commission 
in meeting with senators." 
https://archive.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/04/16/pashteen-reiterates-formation-
of-commission-in-meeting-with-senators/  
20 See the daily live Facebook discussions of the Afghan diaspora, such as this: 
https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100063486131874 
21 In their social media narratives, Afghan activists and intellectuals openly ask 
the Afghans to use the PTM to pay Pakistan back in "kind." Just as Pakistan used 
the Mujahideen and now use the Taliban for its proxy wars in Afghanistan, the 
Afghans must use the PTM to disintegrate Pakistan.  
22 Pakistan is a military dominated federal state. Punjab is its largest federating 
unit and the largest military recruitment area, which has led many Afghan 
activists to term the whole Pakistan state the "Punjab Regiment."  
23 For example, the recent Afghan social media activists attack in Saudi Arabia 
on Akhundzada Mahmud, a Pakistanised Pashtun social media activists.  
https://www.facebook.com/farhat.taj.184/videos/194309119317987 
24 For example, see their daily facebook clashes. 
25 See, for example, social media pages of leading PTM activists, such as Said 




																																								 																																							 																																							 									
26 Naqib is Naqib Mahsud, the young man whose extrajudicial killing led to the 
creation of PTM.  Najib is Dr. Najibullah, the former president of Afghanistan, 
hanged by the Taliban with alleged ISI support. 
27 Some people are linked with the Awami National Party (ANP) and the 
Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP), such as Afrasiab Khattak, Usman 
Kakar, and even Mahmud Khan Achakzai, a PMAP leader, who once called the 




28 Such as the PTM activists, Arman Loni and Arif Wazir, who were recently 
killed.  
29 For example, Pakistan says that India and other hostile agencies fund the 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) . Pakistan is widely accused, including by the 
US, of supporting the Haqqani Network Taliban in Afghanistan.  
30 For example, the Haqani Taliban are said to be the proxies of Pakistan fighting 
in Afghanistan and the TTP militants—who attack Pakistan army—are proxy of 
other countries who want to damage Pakistan. The Pakistan army used massive 
kinetic operations to eliminate TTP in the border districts and the US army used 
drone attacks, allegedly with consent from the Pakistan army's leadership, to 
target militants. This does not imply that the US and Pakistan always agree on 
the way the war on terror is conducted. 
31 PTM leaders, such as Said Alam Mahsud, have demanded a UN TRC.  
32 https://nacta.gov.pk/history/ 
33 The PTM leader, Manzoor Pashteen, has confirmed in his social media 
interviews that several hundred disappeared persons have come home following 
the PTM's emergence. 
34 Several schools, parks, and roads have been named after students, policemen, 
and political leaders killed in terror attacks. 
35 The Urdu book Main Madai hu mujrim nahin (I am Petitioner, not Criminal). 
A copy of the book is available on the social media accounts of PTM supporters.		
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